Introduction
New Zealand has for many years been a proponent of the light-handed regulation of financial institutions. New Zealand investors are solely responsible for their investment decisions, unable to rely on official government regulators/examiners or the perverse crutch of deposit insurance 1 . Instead, armed with disclosure statements New Zealand bank and non-bank depositors are expected to apply market discipline to ensure the safety and soundness of their deposits. Wilson, Rose & Pinfold (2012b) demonstrated New Zealand's disclosure regime in
Registered Banks 2 worked well in moderating excessive risk taking, concluding that bank directors and managers applied self-discipline. However this was not the case in New Zealand finance companies 3 , where Wilson (2009) judged disclosure to be of such a poor quality it was of little value. Further, Wilson, Rose & Pinfold (2012a) found some finance companies paid lip service to any code of corporate governance, as their boards were dominated by inside directors who appeared more concerned with their own investment than that of outsiders.
Unsurprisingly, New Zealand suffered a systemic failure of the finance company industry, with over 48% of its 200 finance companies failing since 2006. In all over $6 billion of depositor funds were placed at risk, the bulk of which came from unsophisticated retail investors. As a result funding to non-bank deposit-takers (NBDTs), from New Zealand residents, dropped from a high of $13.578 billion in June 2009 to $6.430 billion in June 2013 (RBNZ, 2013) . The failure of finance companies in New Zealand began prior to the global financial crisis (GFC) and continued after the GFC. While New Zealand finance companies felt the impact of the GFC; the GFC was not the cause of the collapse of the New Zealand finance company industry. This paper utilises the failure of Lombard Finance and Investments Ltd (this 1 In October 2008 the NZ government introduced a temporary deposit guarantee. This was not primarily designed to protect depositors but was justified by the perceived difficulty for NZ financial institutions to raise capital on international credit markets. The NZ government felt it was necessary to introduce the temporary deposit guarantee as the Australian government was intending to introduce a similar guarantee which would have disadvantaged NZ institutions. occurring between managers and shareholders. In financial institutions depositors, who don't have representation at the board, are able to free-ride on agency protections enjoyed by shareholders. What was unknown to depositors, when Lombard was first formed, was all the shareholders of Lombard were also board members of Lombard. This resulted in a significant agency issue for Lombard depositors.
The remainder of this paper includes a brief literature review looking at three areas; agency conflict in financial institutions, the benefits of independent directors and lastly the use of celebrities as directors. The following discussion utilises public disclosure documents, receivers' reports along with Court documents from the trials of Lombard directors, to detail events at Lombard from its formation in 2002 to its collapse in 2008. Throughout the discussion these events involve agency issues and highlight the actions of Lombard's celebrity and independent directors. The question posed in this paper is; what, if any, value did these independent and celebrity directors bring to investors in Lombard?
Literature
Trust is paramount in business transactions and there are extensive strands of academic literature examining agency problems and the concept of independent and celebrity directors.
The following review identifies those aspects of the literature that are relevant in the discussion relating to the failure of Lombard.
Whenever you employ another party, to whom you give decision making authority, you face agency issues and costs. Agency issues are related to information asymmetries. In business, the managers of the firm have superior information to that held by investors. There is an academic history looking at both agency theory and the closely linked moral hazard (where the agent uses the funds supplied for a different more risky purpose) (Ross, 1973) (Fama & Jensen, 1983 Asymmetric information has long been recognised by researchers as a problem with attempts made to curb its negative impacts (Sharpe, 1990 ). Sharpe's (1990) findings' reflect the comments of Selznick (1947 Selznick ( /1966 in his study of the Tennessee Valley Authority
Bank type organisations are unique in that generally they employ low levels of equity, often less than ten percent, and regulators attempting to address this have resorted to official bank examiners to check on mandated minimum levels of capital, public disclosure of relevant risk information and compulsory deposit insurance. Although Lombard was not a bank, the fact that it took fixed term deposits from the public, its depositors faced issues similar to bank depositors. Depositors in finance companies, such as Lombard, don't enjoy the protections afforded to bank depositors (see (W.R. Wilson et al., 2012b) for an overview of prudential regulation of New Zealand banks).
In the period covered by this study (2002 to 2008) In the following discussion we move to the question of independent directors. One of the purposes of a board, and in particular the use of independent directors, is to attempt to overcome the agency effects of having a governance body that has a strong material tie to the organisation (Campbell, 1949) . Indeed Konsik (1987, p. 163) notes that as early as 1965 the United States SEC required a minimum of three 'independent' that is outside or non-executive directors on the board. This was done so as to try and ensure some 'independence' from the organization at board level. In the 21 st century it has been argued by Lee and Wang (2014) that the role of the independent director is to provide a check on the management of the company.
In effect they argue, the independent director performs a monitoring role. Their role is to provide governance, oversight and ensure that the management of the company act in the best interests of the shareholders. However Lee and Wang (2014) go on to suggest that independent directors cannot adequately perform this role when faced with a board that consists of controlling shareholders.
In a Similar vein Persons, (2012) previous to Lee and Wang (2014) found that when an independent director is rewarded in stock options then they are more likely to place a higher emphasis on short term, rather than strategic goals for the company. In addition the existence of stock options for independent directors leads to less questioning of high risk activity by company management (Persons, 2012, p. 56) . A more concerning result of Person's work, and one that has some relevance for the current discussion, was an independent director primarily compensated with stock options was more likely to engage in fraudulent reporting in regards to the company (Persons, 2012, p. 60 Staff, 2014) . Substantial interest is further explained as being such that the director is likely to derive in the current company year a substantial portion of his or her annual revenue as a result of his or her interest in the company.
As this discussion involves not only the independent director but also the aspect of celebrity it is to this aspect that we now move.
Traditionally, the celebrity endorser was drawn from the arena of popular culture. They included such people as actors, singers, sports personalities or well-known spokespeople. In short they were, as McCracken (1989, p. 310) in his seminal work on celebrity endorsement stated, "A person who is known and enjoys wide public recognition". The power of the celebrity endorser relies on the twin aspects of high public recognition in the mind of the receiver -described as the concept, transference of meaning (Halonen-Knight & Hurmerinta, 2010; McCraken, 1989) . Transference of meaning is the key attribute for an organisation expecting to utilise the 'power' of a celebrity endorser. McCracken (1989) outlined the minimum criteria for a successful celebrity endorsement campaign. They are credibility, trust, and recognition. An effective meaning transfer takes place when the public recognises important aspects in the endorser. The first of these is source credibility. In essence this is the impression that the endorser is seen as a person who has a high level of expertise and experience in the area being endorsed (Tantiseneepony, Gorton, & White, 2012) . In addition the endorser is seen to be trustworthy in relation to the statements being made about the product. Finally the endorser needs to embody aspects that the viewer recognises in themselves (McCraken, 1989) .The aim in the use of a celebrity endorser is to build confidence in the mind of the public and impart an aspirational feeling in their mind. To this end the organisation utilising the endorser is attempting to transfer the positive 'meaning' the endorser brings onto the product or service being promoted (Bryne, Whitehead, & Breen, 2003) For success, the choice of endorser is therefore a significant marketing decision that needs to be made, with the chosen celebrity a good match with the product being advertised (Ding, Molchanov, & Stork, 2011) . This decision will reflect the type of image that the organisation wants to project. In particular the organisation will be seeking to reflect an archetype (Campbell, 1949) , which can be easily identified by the viewer. For example the producers of a cooking show indicate the type of audience they are after by their selection of say, Jamie Oliver, Gordon Ramsay or Nigella Lawson as their chef. A concrete example of how the above discussion was played out in New Zealand, was the choice of Kevin Milne, a well-known "consumer champion" as a spokesperson for The Carpet Mill, a manufacturer of carpet. Mr Milne has source credibility based upon his long career as a consumer advocate in New Zealand. This has ensured he is known and respected as a person given to making 'objective' reviews of consumer products and with a history of 'standing up' for the common person. The two examples we have mentioned have arguably come from popular culture; a television journalist and accepted celebrity chefs. The work cited above by Ding et al., (2011) provides several illustrations of the different elements of celebrity endorsement. So far we have briefly outlined the suggested attributes of a celebrity endorser. As it will become clear celebrity endorsement was only one aspect of the Lombard case that will be discussed. The second aspect that will be discussed is that of the independent director and the role of the board in the governance of Lombard. Early in the 21 st Century, commentary on the composition of boards and the propensity for investors to value prestige of the individuals concerned in the governance of the organisation was raised by Certo (2003) . In his article Certo (2003) demonstrated a wide favourable public perception of an individual was one of the deciding aspects for future investment; particularly in a new business.
The method utilised to examine the phenomenon of how independent celebrity directors can have an effect on investor's impressions of security is essentially through a case study examination of how the Directors of Lombard investments relied upon their celebrity status to solicit deposits. The examination is from the inception of the company to the eventual collapse and court action that followed. Following Piekkari, Oxlheim and Randoy (2014, p. 4) Lombard was chosen as the vehicle due to meeting a number of clearly identified criteria which had an appreciable impact upon the reasons the depositors were attracted to the Lombard brand. Although Lombard was only one of 200 finance companies that failed since 2006 it was the only one that was actively trading on the high profile of the directors. In addition Lombard was one of the few finance companies that were making a virtue of the independent nature of the majority of the directors. In relating the action that is outlined in the discussion below, we have ensured that the adopted methods used to place the stated experiences of the individual depositors have been placed within a bounded context. In this respect a story, their story, including court transcripts, emails and publicity material can be read and bounded by a number of constraints. One such constraint is the time frame; all the information gathered relates to a period of time when property based finance companies were very popular in New Zealand. That is all the activity relates only to the property investment market. This bounding of time and place follows closely the method adopted by Piekkari et al., (2014) in their investigation of the role a common language plays in successful Board operations. By placing the case within such a time and context boundary it allows for examination of the specific case rather than an assumption of generality. This was deemed necessary in order to provide a common context for the resulting discussion. Following (Czarniawska-Joerges) (1998), such an approach allows for time and place comparisons that provide a theoretical framework from which the words gathered could be interpreted.
The resulting discussion, drawn from the court documents publicity material and email communications are stories constructed by our interpretation of the stated words of the individual depositors. When these words are placed alongside extant literature, they provide a vehicle for the application of an interpretative lens, an alternative interpretation which results in a vertical, rather than a more traditional horizontal, interpretation of the text (Monin & Monin, 2003) . A vertical interpretation attempts to gain an understanding of the subtext. The subtext is a situation which can be considered as plausible but that has not been expressly stated. In effect we are applying a critical discourse method in interpretation of the case. This way the method adopted aims to assist the reader in locating the underlying ideological premises that have helped shape the investors perception of 'safety' or 'security'.
The individual investors and Directors could be considered part of the New Zealand 'middle class' and being involved in a property investment company was a part of their social reality of the time (Carr, 2000) . Finally, the above approach was chosen as it aims, above all, to establish plausibility. In this regard the method chosen provides a mechanism by which action within a defined institution may be interpreted and understood. It is the means by which we as and the interpreter and the reader, as the viewer, may make sense of the investors' world. In presenting the examples that follow it is intended to illustrate how the actions of the Directors, in particular Graham has had a significant influence upon the desires of individuals to invest with Lombard investments. The words used in the publicity material of Lombard and the words the Judge used to describe such publicity material are grounded in the impressions that a researcher or interested reader may gain from either applying their own interpretations or accepting the researcher's interpretation of reality. It is a process of discovery (Glaser & Strauss, 1999, p. 23 ). In addition, in conducting this research we are following the theories of Ragin (1987) , Walton (1993) , Montuori & Purser (1995) and Eisenhardt (1989) in that a case can also be seen in terms individual actors who, when placed into an organisational or institutional setting, form a case of a firm, or of an historical event.
Further, the use of case method in this study is considered appropriate, in that the reader can trace, through the discussion that follows possible justifications for the actions of the investors and Directors in the story (Schatzman & Strauss., 1973, p. 110) . In addition it is intended that the method adopted will allow the reader to identify the connecting links that have enabled us to build the discussion that illustrates the participants' beliefs. The adoption of the case study method is therefore, by its very nature, an attempt to understand the individuals within the particular bounded social setting. thousand of equity 7 . Although the summary of financial statements in (Fisk & Waller, 2008) . Lombard initially solicited investments through print and television media. However by 2006 Lombard investments limited had become more sophisticated in soliciting funds from the public and, along with their prospectus documents and public presentations in mid-range hotels, had also released a DVD which explained the background of the company. The Directors denied in court that the DVD constituted an advertisement. The DVD opens with the following words in white on a black background.
Discussion

"Lombard is about people, the people involved in our governance, management and team are all committed to the people who entrust their investments to Lombard"
(Lombard Finance Staff, 2006) .
From the beginning of the DVD it is clear that Lombard is utilising the DVD as an advertisement and is attempting to utilise the past experience of the high profile directors in such a way as to secure trust. In addition it is also clear that from the beginning, Lombard
Investments Limited was a closely held company. The main difference between the use of celebrity by the directors and political patrons rests in payment. The public fully expects that a sports person or entertainer be paid for his or her endorsement. Indeed at times this has caused a conflict with the personality and the product. One such example is the Chef Jamie Oliver who endorses farmed salmon while declaring that farmed salmon are not as desirable wild salmon. Or the example of Tiger Woods and the loss of contacts once he had been 'disgraced' (Bartz, Molchanov, & Stork, 2013) However, in many instances a politician will ensure that their name is 'lent' without any expectation of direct financial reward, instead they are seen as 'independent' albeit celebrity voices. The independent directors were able to assert their 'independence' in that they did not individually own more than 5% the stock (NZID Staff, 2014)(NZ Institute of Directors, 2014 , NZX 2014 .
However unknown to most investors these independent directors were also shareholders of Lombard with Graham, for instance. holding around 4% of the equity of Lombard. Although they were technically and within the law 'independent' as they each held less than 5% a great deal of the future wealth of Graham and Jeffries appeared to rest with the future success of Lombard. In the case of Lombard as we demonstrate, the organisation goes to some effort to explain that the majority of the board is independent. However it is apparent that prior to the back door listing on the NZX all shares in the company were held by board members -both executive and independent. Debt investors in Lombard would have been unaware the independent directors of Lombard had purchased shares in Lombard, for one cent each, from March 2003 as it was not disclosed in earlier prospectuses (Lombard Group Ltd, 2006b ).
Such a claim reflects recent research regarding independent directors and the potential for agency conflict (Lee & Wang, 2014; Persons, 2012) For example, although the independent directors in Lombard did not hold stock options they did only pay one cent for shares nominally valued at one dollar and did stand to gain large benefits if their decisions in 2006 to 2008 were ultimately successful.
The issue to be considered in the Lombard case is one of perception. However, the Lombard Trust Deed and various Prospectuses resulted in an explicit fiduciary duty to the Lombard trustee and all depositors. Such a role could be difficult if the board is also comprised of shareholders. There is also the tacit intent that independent directors specifically, would question the actions of the company management. In the Lombard case as we outline, there was perhaps a tendency to concentrate on immediate returns at the expense of long term strategic goals of the organisation. A particularly worrying tendency in an organisation that made specific mention of the benefits that could be derived though long term investment in Lombard.
Such actions are best seen in the promotion DVD released by Lombard. The comments, which are indicated in several places below, can be seen as a transference of meaning or as a a illustration of endorser 'match (Ding et al, 2011) . . This is an interesting statement for Graham to make, as he is clearly suggesting that he has both the credibility to be a director and that he is aware of the role of a director, fulfilling the requirements of being a good 'match' for the product (Ding et al 2011) . Yet during the court case that followed the collapse of Lombard the directors suggested that they relied on the information given to them by the management. Such an assumption goes against the purpose of having a board in the first place. For example Hoitash (2011) writing in the Journal of Business Ethics clearly states that the role of the independent director in particular is to be a check on the management of the organisation (Hoitash, 2011, p. 400) . Dobson J appears to agree as he had this to say regarding such reliance "Directors are appointed to exercise judgement and that extends to testing the competence of management within areas in which managers are relied upon" (Justice Dobson, 2012 para 35) . It would appear on the face of it that Justice Dobson at least understood the purpose of a board was to provide oversight and give direction, not the other way around.
Other examples of celebrity and an apparent lack of independence from the Directors appear when viewing the DVD.
Throughout the eleven minute DVD appeals to "trust" (17) and "experience" (13) appear often. These words are spoken by both the Directors and the current investors. Again this assists in the construction of the ex-cabinet ministers performing the role of an archetype (Campbell, 1949) . In this case they can be described as archetypical celebrity endorsers in that they fulfil the various elements of celebrity endorsement as suggested by McCracken (1989) .
Although there are only two sets of customers that appear on the DVD both sets give credence to the argument that the public reputation of the Directors a primary reason for investing.
Finally to reinforce the assumption that Doug Graham (in particular) was acting in the style of a celebrity endorser is evidence from the fraud trial of the Lombard directors. During the trial one witness suggests that it was Doug Graham, the personality, which encouraged them to invest in Lombard. " [57] There is no doubt that those good reputations have been relied on by Lombard as a powerful tool in soliciting funds from investors. Sir Douglas, I am satisfied that your reputation was a very important, and possibly the single most important, factor relied upon by investors in Lombard. That is consistently demonstrated by the terms of the offer documents, incidentally by the DVD, by the witness statements admitted without challenge, and by the victim impact statements. The comfort that investors could rely on you was supplemented to a material extent by the additional assurance from the presence of Mr Jeffries on the Board". (Justice Dobson, 2012 para 55 & 57) For the Greens and other unnamed witnesses who gave evidence at the fraud trial of Graham and Jeffries, the very inclusion of Graham as an independent director on the board of Lombard, and the fact that Lombard was sponsoring a "good" television show was all the endorsement they needed to invest. During the court case it becomes clear that Graham in particular has been seen by some of the investors as both an 'endorser' for the company and clearly identified as a prime mover within the company. The transcript below raises questions of agency when an independent director stands to substantially benefit from the future earnings of the company. Again from Justice Dobson.
[55] In addition to these statements, the parties agreed pursuant to s 9(2) of the Evidence Act 2006 on the admission of facts relating to the circumstances of another couple who were actual or potential investors in LFIL and who attended a presentation at the Crowne Plaza Hotel in Christchurch in September 2007. That couple recalls Sir Douglas Graham as the main speaker being supported by senior management of LFIL and they recall Sir Douglas speaking very positively about LFIL. Promotional materials available included copies of the DVD.
It is a recognised concept that the role of the board of directors is to provide oversight and governance to the organisation (Boulton, 1978; Kosnik, 1987, p. 163) . In many cases an organisation will ensure that the board is comprised of 'independent' directors in an attempt to overcome possible agency conflicts that may arise. However, at least one recent publication has questioned the truly independent nature of 'independent' directors (Misangyi & Archarya, 2014) . Instead they suggest the predominance of independent directors has more to do with legitimacy concerns. In this regard they are positing an institutional reason for the growth of independent directors on boards. Regardless of independent, Executive or non-executive Directors their role remains the same, as pointed out in a New Zealand Financial Markets Authority publication for Directors. "Directors direct, managers manage. That is the essential difference between governance and management" (NZID Staff, 2014, p. 4) . Whilst the shareholding of Graham and Jeffries was not a substantial amount, it is arguable that they stood to derive a substantial portion of their future personal wealth from the activities of Lombard.
Given this, perhaps the rules regarding the nature of independent directors need to be revised. [53] Evidence for the Crown included statements from six investors in LFIL. Mrs Hooker of Hamilton gave evidence but was not cross-examined. She had decided in March 2008 not to renew an investment in LFIL debenture stock when it matured. She was contacted by an LFIL employee in early March 2008 and was persuaded to change her mind, thereafter renewing her investment with LFIL. She projected that she would earn $300 more per annum on her $30,000 re-invested with LFIL than if it was invested as a term deposit with Kiwibank. In the course of her dealings with LFIL in early March 2008, she requested and was sent copies of the DVD, which is the subject of count five, and the investment statement for secured debenture stock.
Graham and Jeffries were charged under laws they had either played a part in drafting or subsequently applied as Ministers of the Crown.
Conclusions
Lombard didn't fail because its directors issued an untrue prospectus at the end of 2007. March (Fisk & Waller, 2008) . With the value of hindsight, these deposits were probably at risk from the day they were first made. The receivers' most recent report (13 th ) on the affairs of Lombard reports payments of 22 cents in the dollar to 3,900 secured debenture holders, with the receivers now believing the final return to secured debenture holders will be 24% to 25% (Fisk & McCloy, 2014) . As the balance of secured debentures was $111 million as at 10 April directors and investors at $83 million.
Losses at Lombard can be attributed to a number of factors; some of which the directors of Lombard could argue were beyond their control, such as significant change in the commercial and residential property market which occurred in 2006 and 2007. Even if a deteriorating property market was beyond the control of directors, they still had a responsibility to disclose this material change to investors in their prospectus. For effective market discipline, investors, disclosure statements such as prospectuses need to be truthful and not misleading.
The directors of Lombard appear to have buried their heads in the sand, believing they could weather a declining property market. They were wrong.
However, other, controllable factors such as the 'independent' nature of the directors are worth considering as causes of the collapse, especially in a closely held business such as
Lombard. There has been a growing trend for an increase in the number of independent directors on all boards (Hoitash, 2011) . Indeed the latest listing rules for the New Zealand stock exchange call for half the board in their new "high risk" market to be independent. However independent directors are not a panacea for all ills. Independent directors need to bring transferable skills, which add value to the firm. In the case of Lombard, questions can be asked as to the degree of independence of the independent directors, and the applicability of their skill sets to financial decision making. While they were judged independent if one follows the guidelines of the NZID or the NZX it was not until the backdoor NZX listing of Lombard occurred that investors would have been aware the independent directors of Lombard had an ownership interest in the firm. While a 3% or 4% is below the suggested independence threshold of 5% it could have resulted in a considerable increase in the personal wealth of Lombard's directors if Lombard had ultimately been successful.
However there were also some fundamental reasons why Lombard may have failed.
They include a lack of equity. Lombard was established with $500 thousand of paid in capital and while questions remain regarding the purchase of the Lombard name from Meridian Capital, controlled by Reeves, for $500 thousand the bigger question is if 10% capital is sufficient for a property financier. The lack of diversification in the loan book could also be a further contributing factor to collapse. As previously mentioned 96% of their assets were in their property loan book and only a few had first ranking security. Finally the majority of loans made by Lombard were interest only which although Lombard was reporting profits from its second year of operation very little of this was represented as cash in their financial statements.
As result retained earning which were added to their equity to bring it to the required 10% level did not eventuate.
Ultimately, questions remaining unanswered are; did the independent directors have so much of their personal wealth invested in Lombard Group shares that they were not making decisions in the best interests of Lombard or its stakeholders, most of who had more invested than the independent directors. What if any value did these independent and celebrity directors bring to investors in Lombard?
